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Abstract 
Both Confucian and Aristotelian theories of virtue characterize virtue as the mean. Why does each, independently from each 
other, develop a doctrine of the mean? Is it purely coincidental, or is there a deep philosophical and historical reason for this 
striking similarity? This paper seeks to develop a new understanding of Aristotle’s mean as well as Confucius’s mean, and to 
show that there is deep philosophical reason for their similarity. 
 
I argue that, for both ethics, the mean is not a notion of quantity or proportionality, but is identified with what is right. Calling 
what is right the “mean” happens because both sides follow the model of archery in their effort to explicate the nature of virtue. 
For both, the doctrine of the mean is meant to show that virtue should be conceived as an archery like quality, and that a virtuous 
agent who is disposed to act or live rightly is likened to an excellent archer who has the skill to hit the target. A virtuous agent 
forms and exercises his virtue, just as an archer develops and exercises his archery. 
 
Both Confucius and Aristotle characterize virtue as the mean. For Aristotle, virtue is a mean between two vices (Nicomachean 
Ethics˷NE˹ 1107a2), and a disposition “laying in a mean ˷mesotƝti˹ relative to us.” (NE, 1106b36) Clearly, the mean is 
essential to what virtue is. iFor Confucius, “Supreme indeed is the mean as virtue.” (Analects, 6:29) The mean is the supreme 
virtue (de). Since Confucius’s theory of ren (excellence, usually translated as “benevolence” or “humanity”) is his version of the 
theory of de (virtue), to say that de is the mean amounts to saying that excellence (ren), as virtue in general, is the mean.ii The 
statement in Analects 6:29 is repeated in The Doctrine of Mean (Zhongyong, chap. 3), which, as one of the Confucian Four 
Books, can be read as an elaboration of this idea of Confucius. iii 
 
Why do Aristotle and Confucius, independently from each other, each develop a doctrine of the mean? Is it purely coincidental, 
or is there a deep philosophical and historical reason for this striking similarity? This paper seeks to develop a new understanding 
of Aristotle’s mean as well as Confucius’s mean, and to show that there is deep philosophical reason for their similarity. Section 
one shows that for both, the mean is divided into inner mean and outer mean. The inner mean manifests itself by hitting the outer 
mean. In section two, I argue that, for both ethics, the mean is not a notion of quantity or proportionality, but is identified with 
what is right. Calling what is right the “mean” happens because both sides follow the model of archery in their effort to explicate 
the nature of virtue. Section three further suggests that, for both, the doctrine of the mean is meant to show that virtue should be 
conceived as archery like quality, and that a virtuous agent who is disposed to act or live rightly is likened to an excellent archer 
who has the skill to hit the target. A virtuous agent forms and exercises his virtue, just as an archer develops and exercises his 
archery. 
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1. The Mean: Inner and Outer 
Traditionally, Aristotle’s mean has been understood as moderation. Taken as such, it is thought to be 
philosophically insignificant and even false. For instance, Bernard Williams dismisses the doctrine of the mean as 
“one of the most celebrated and least useful parts of his ˷Aristotle’s˹ system.”iv Yet to interpret the mean as 
moderation is difficult to square with some textual evidence. Aristotle explicitly remarks: “In respect of its 
substance and the account which states its essence it is a mean, with regard to what is best and right it is an extreme” 
(NE, 1107a6-8). The mean is not moderate; rather, it becomes an extreme in doing the best and right thing. He also 
emphasizes that, while a virtue is a mean, there is no mean state within a virtue, and equally there is no mean state 
within a vice (NE, 1107a22-26). Virtue is simply right, and vice is simply wrong. If the mean is not moderation, 
what, then what does Aristotle understand by it? What is the point of claiming that virtue is the mean between two 
extremes? This issue has been a subject of intense debate among Aristotelian commentators. 
Equally, what is meant by the mean has also been a topic of controversy among Confucian commentators. 
According to Chan, “In the Analects, zhong yong, often translated the ‘Mean,’ denotes moderation.”v Yet, as is the 
case in Aristotle, the moderation interpretation is difficult to square with Confucian textual evidence. Confucius 
says, “The excellent person ˷Junzi, usually translated as “Gentleman”˹ agrees with others without being an echo” 
(Analects, 13:23). “Without being an echo” means that the excellent person does not invariably follow the trend and 
stay safe. Indeed, Confucius names the person who tries to please everyone “the village worthy” (shanyuan) and 
condemns such a person as “the ruin of virtue” (Analects 17:13). When his most beloved disciple Yen-Wei dies, “in 
weeping for him, the Master showed extreme grief.” Some of his disciples say to him, “Master, your grief is 
extreme.” “Is it?” Confucius replies, “If I do not feel extreme grief for this man, for whom should I feel?” (Analects 
11:9) Apparently he does not think that a moderate response in this circumstance is appropriate. 
The Chinese term zhongyong is composed of two words: zhong and yong. It is generally agreed that zhong is 
“middle” or “central;” yet there is an age old debate regarding the meaning of yong in Chinese classical 
commentaries. Three major interpretations stand out: (1) yong means “to use,” or “to practice;”vi (2) it is “what is 
unchangeable;” vii  (3) it means “ordinary,” or “common.” viii  Different definitions of yong lead to different 
interpretations of what the Confucian mean is,ix and even to different translations of the book that is entitled 
Zhongyong. x 
Now let us see whether a comparison of Aristotle and Confucius can clarify the situation a bit in each case. Let us 
start with the issue of the location of the mean. Aristotle applies the mean both to the inner state of character and to 
the outer expression of virtue in feelings and actions. On the one hand, virtue itself is said to be “lying in a mean 
state ˷en mesotƝti˹” (NE, 1106b36), a state between two vices, represented respectively by excess and deficiency 
(NE, 1107a2-3). I call this the “inner mean.” On the other hand, Aristotle also says that virtue “both finds and 
chooses that which is the mean˷meson˹” (NE, 1107a5), and that virtue “is concerned with passions and actions, 
and in these there is excess, defect, and the mean ˷meson˹” (NE, 1106b16-17). Accordingly, the mean is located 
in passions and actions. I call this the “outer mean.” 
There has been a debate about which mean, the inner or the outer, is Aristotle’s real concern. This raises the 
further question of whether the mean disposition should be interpreted independently of the mean expressed in 
passions and actions, or vice versa. There are two opposing views on this point. In J. O. Urmson’s understanding, 
Aristotle’s virtue of character is “a mean or intermediate disposition regarding emotions and actions, not that it is a 
disposition towards mean or intermediate emotions and actions.”xi In other words, it is the inner mean, or the mean 
disposition, that is Aristotle’s primary interest. The opposite view holds that virtue is a mean state, not because it 
itself is a mean of something, but because it aims at the mean in passions and actions. For example, Julia Annas 
says: “The substance of the claim that virtues are mean states must therefore lie in the way that they aim at the mean 
in feelings or pathƝ.”xii According to this reading, when one interprets the doctrine of the mean, the focus should be 
on the mean in passions and actions. 
My own view is that these two sides do not have to be in conflict. Aristotle locates the mean in both the inner and 
the outer, in both virtuous character and virtuous passions and actions. This is because for him these two aspects are 
intrinsically inseparable. On the one hand, Aristotle holds that the virtuous passions and actions issue forth from the 
virtuous state of character that is the mean state. Proper conduct must emanate characteristically from a fixed 
disposition if it is to be truly virtuous conduct. Whether an act is good or virtuous should be judged in relation to the 
agent. In NE, 1105a32-b1, Aristotle lists three conditions that an agent must meet in order for his act to be counted 
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as virtuous: (a) “he must have knowledge”; (b) “he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes”; and 
(3) “his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character.” Given this, it is the inner state that is more 
important. On the other hand, virtue is for the human good, i.e., happiness, and happiness consists not merely in the 
possession of virtue, but in the exercise of it. Happiness must consist in an active life. Aristotle emphasizes: “It 
matters quite a bit whether we suppose that the best good consists in possessing or in using, i.e., in a state or in an 
activity” (NE, 1098b33-1099a2). The virtuous agent must manifest his or her virtues in actions. Without achieving 
the outer mean, the inner mean state does not count for much. It is in pursuing virtuous activities that one obtains 
happiness. 
Where, then, is the Confucian mean located? The Analects itself does not give us enough material to reconstruct 
the location. Yet in the first chapter of the Doctrine of the Mean, we read: 
 
Before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are issued ˷fa˹, one is in a state that is called the mean ˷zhong˹. 
When these feelings are issued ˷fa˹, and each and all hit due measure and degree ˷zhongjie˹, one is in a state that is called 
harmony ˷he˹.xiii 
 
The passage suggests that the mean (zhong) is an inner state of feeling, and there is also an aspect of “hitting” 
what is appropriate in one’s life or conduct when this inner mean is exercised. This outer aspect is called “harmony” 
(he). Apparently, the zhong-he structure corresponds to Aristotle’s inner mean outer mean structure. 
Since “the mean” is a translation of the Chinese term zhongyong, we are led to ask: Where is the place of yong in 
this zhong-he structure? How is zhong-he related to zhongyong? As mentioned earlier, there have been three 
traditional interpretations of yong: “practice,” “unchangeable,” and “ordinary.” For the following reasons, I side 
with the first interpretation. The earliest Chinese etymological dictionary, Shuowenjiezi, lists “to use” as the basic 
sense of yong. The word for “to use” sounds the same as yong in Chinese. More importantly, to take yong as “to 
use” allows us to interpret zhongyong as “using the mean.” “Using the mean” is a recurring idea in Confucianism. In 
Analects 20:1 it is recorded that the sage king Yao told his successor Shun: “The succession, ordained by Heaven, 
has fallen on you. Hold to the mean (zhong).” Shun, when handing his position over to his successor (the sage king) 
Yu, is reported to have spoken these same words to the latter. Accordingly, “to hold to the mean” seems to be the 
most fundamental dao (way) of the sage kings. Yet “to hold to the mean” amounts to “using or practicing the mean,” 
as is suggested by the following passage from the Doctrine of the Mean (chap. 6): 
 
Shun was fond of questioning others and examining their words, however ordinary. He concealed what was bad in them and 
displayed what was good. He grasped their two extremes, and then used ˷yong˹ the mean ˷zhong˹ between them in his 
dealings with the people. This was how he became Shun. 
 
Shun uses the mean in politics, and thereby becomes a great sage-king. Yao, Shun, and Yu are sage kings and 
also personify the Confucian paradigm of the excellent person (junzi). If “using the mean” is what makes them great 
sage-kings, it is also what makes them excellent persons. We can therefore say that to be an exemplary person is to 
hold to or to practice the mean. 
In understanding yong as “to use” or “to practice,” we are in a position to explain the relation between the mean 
and zhong-he. In the above-quoted passage from the Mean, when the inner state is “issued ˷fa˹, and each and all 
hit due measure and degree ˷zhongjie˹, one is in a state that is called harmony ˷he˹.” I would like to propose 
that the term fa (to issue, or to exercise) here serves the role of yong, or “practice.” When the inner mean is 
exercised, the agent hits the target in life and conduct. Taken this way, the term zhongyong (mean) combines two 
ideas: the mean state, and its use or manifestation. For Aristotle, the exercise of virtue is essential, for otherwise 
one’s life is lived in a sleeping state. When Confucius conjoins zhong and yong, and calls it “the supreme virtue,” he 
must be stressing, like Aristotle, that one not only needs to possess virtues, but also must manifest or exercise them. 
If the foregoing discussion is correct, we see a striking structural parallel between Aristotle’s mean and 
Confucian mean. Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean involves three aspects: 
 
(1) the inner mean in disposition; 
(2) the outer mean in feeling and actions; and 
(3) practicing the inner mean to hit the outer mean. 
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The Confucian doctrine of the mean also involves three elements: 
 
(1) zhong (the inner mean); 
(2) he (harmony, the outer mean); and 
(3) yong, practicing the inner mean to hit the outer mean. 
 
Let us proceed to examine in more detail what the outer mean and the inner mean are in both ethics, starting from 
the outer mean. 
2. Hitting the Mean 
For both Aristotle and Confucius, the mean is the middle point between excess and deficiency. A virtue is a mean 
because there are two vices corresponding to it. Aristotle remarks: “Virtue is a mean ˷mesotƝs˹ between two 
vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect” (NE, 1107a2-3). Confucius thinks in the 
same way. “Zi Gong asked, ‘Who is superior, Shi or Shang?’ The Master said, ‘Shi goes beyond the due mean, and 
Shang does not come up to it...’ To go beyond is as wrong as to fall short” (Analects 11:16). Here we have one 
mean, and two corresponding vices: going beyond and falling short. At Analects 13:21, “The Master said, ‘having 
failed to find the man who walks in the middle way ˷zhong xing˹ for associates, one should, if there were no 
alternative, have to turn to the undisciplined and the over scrupulous. The former are enterprising, while the latter 
will draw the line at certain kinds of action.’” We should keep company with the person who holds the mean. xivHere 
the two vices corresponding to the mean are lack of discipline and over-scrupulousness. W. D. Ross uses the phrase 
“trinitarian scheme” to refer to Aristotle’s view that for every virtue there are two distinct vices.xv I think this term 
can also be neatly applied to the Confucian mean. 
In addition to the trinitarian scheme, both Aristotle and Confucius frequently identify the mean with “what is 
right.” For Aristotle: “To feel these feelings at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right 
people, with the right aim, and the right way, is what is both mean ˷meson˹ and best ˷ariston˹; and this is 
characteristic of virtue” (NE, 1106b21-23;). Again: “It ˷virtue˹ is a mean because the vices respectively fall short 
of or exceed what is right ˷to deon, or what ought to be done˹ in both passions and actions” (NE, 1107a3-4). Here 
the mean is characterized in terms of “the right” and “what ought to be done.” It is associated with and even appears 
to be a synonym for “best” (Eudemian Ethics, 1220b29), for “good” (spoudaion, and eǌ), and for “noble” (kalon) 
(NE, 1109a23-29). 
The same line of thinking can also be discerned in Confucius: “The excellent person, in his dealing with the 
world, is not invariably for or against anything. He follows only what is appropriate ˷yi˹’” (Analects, 4:10). Since 
the excellent person is the virtuous agent who has achieved the mean, to say that he follows only what is appropriate 
indicates the intrinsic relation between the mean and what is appropriate. Such a relation is more clearly established 
in the Doctrine of the Mean (chap. 25) where we are told that, when the dao (way) of the mean, the supreme virtue, 
is reached, “whenever it is employed, everything done is right.” In chap. 31, zhong (the mean) and zheng 
(uprightness, correctness) are sometimes simply grouped together as one term, used as an alternative expression of 
the mean.xvi 
There are, then, two views about what the mean is in both Aristotelian and Confucian ethics: 
 
(A) The mean lies in the middle of excess and deficiency. 
(B) The mean is what is right or appropriate. 
 
These two views are clearly different. The first presents the trinitarian scheme and leads many commentators to 
take the mean as a notion of quantity or proportionality, whereas the second entails that the mean is a normative or 
prescriptive notion. Since there does not appear to be a direct connection between “what is right” and the middle, 
one has good reason to wonder why both Aristotle and Confucius conflate them. 
I find little discussion concerning the relation between these two views in Confucian scholarship. Many 
Aristotelian commentators, however, tend to believe that there is a sort of conceptual confusion and even 
contradiction between these two views. For instance, W. D. Ross accepts (B) but rejects (A), saying that “the 
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trinitarian scheme of virtue and vices is mistaken”.xvii In contrast, J. David Blankenship maintains (A) and tries to 
dismiss (B).xviii Yet, since both (A) and (B) are supported by solid textual evidence, we need a better interpretation 
that can accommodate both. This requires us to show that the middle is also the right, so that the two views are not 
in tension. 
Let us start from a clue provided by the Chinese term zhong. In both ancient and contemporary Chinese, zhong is 
used both as a noun and as a verb. As a noun it has a twofold meaning: “middle” and “appropriateness.” As a verb, it 
means “to hit the target,” and this usage is related to archery. When an arrow hits the target, it is called zhongdi or 
mingzhong (“hitting the right target”). The idiom yijian zhongdi (literally, “hitting the target with just one arrow”) is 
usually used to convey the idea that one gets to the point straightforwardly. Even the Chinese character zhong 
originally takes the form of a straight line penetrating through a circle in the middle. 
We are therefore inspired to inquire whether the Confucian mean is related to archery. It becomes immediately 
clear that this archery analogy can be detected in the Confucian zhong-he (inner mean-outer mean) scheme, 
presented in the Mean (chap. 1). It indicates that the inner mean (zhong) is the state of feelings before these feelings 
are issued (fa). “When these feelings are issued (fa), and each and all hit due measure and degree ˷zhongjie˹, one 
is in a state that is called harmony” (The Doctrine of the Mean, chap. 1). In this passage, the word zhong is used 
both as a noun and a verb. The passage also employs the verb fa (to issue). In Chinese, fa is directly related to 
“shooting,” and to the verb zhong (to hit the target). To praise an excellent archer, one says bai fa bai zhong 
(literally, shooting a hundred arrows and hitting the mark a hundred times). This description of the zhong-he scheme 
establishes a link between the inner mean of a virtuous agent and the shooting of an arrow by an archer. Earlier I 
mentioned that fa here serves the role of yong, in the sense of “to use” or “to exercise.” If the current discussion is 
accurate, yong is not just “to exercise,” but more specifically, “to exercise and to hit the target.” 
Indeed, Confucius himself explicitly brings the analogy of archery to the fore: 
 
In archery we have something resembling the way of the excellent person. When the archer misses the center of the target, he 
turns around and seeks the cause of failure within himself. (The Doctrine of the Mean, chap.14) 
 
The way of the excellent person is the way of the mean, and to miss the target amounts to failure to practice the 
mean in one’s actions. An archer examines himself if he misses the target, that is, he reviews the skills of archery 
that he possesses and continues to improve them. Since the mean is likened to the art of archery, we may say that, if 
a person fails to hit the mean in actions, he should examine himself and continue to cultivate the inner mean. This 
also indicates that archery is the craft-model for Confucius when he constructs his doctrine of the mean. The same 
line of thinking is inherited by Mencius, as he likens human excellence (ren) to archery and compares the excellent 
person to the archer. Thus, we read: “Ren is like archery: an archer makes sure his stance is correct before letting fly 
the arrow, and if he fails to hit the mark, he does not hold it against his victor. He simply seeks the cause within 
himself.” (Mencius 2a/7) Again, “An excellent person is full of eagerness when he has drawn his bow, but before he 
lets fly the arrow, he stands in the middle of the path (zhong dao er li), and those who are able to do so follow him.” 
(Mencius 7a/41) 
It is clear to me that the model of archery is behind the Confucian doctrine of the mean. This leads me to ask 
whether the Aristotelian mean is similarly related to archery. The answer is positive. At the outset of the NE when 
Aristotle says that the task of his ethics is to grasp the supreme human good, he unambiguously likens his project of 
pursuing human goodness to archery. 
 
If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake..., and if we do not choose everything for the 
sake of something else..., clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great 
influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what we should ˷ton deon˹? 
(NE, 1094a18-24) 
 
A virtuous person seeks to grasp the highest good just as an archer seeks to hit the target. In describing how a 
virtuous agent exercises the inner mean to reach the outer mean in passions and actions, Aristotle repeatedly uses the 
expression “hitting the mean” (tou mesou stochastikƝ). xix  The word “hitting” (stochastikƝ, from the verb, 
stochazesthai, to aim at or shoot at) strongly suggests that the craft of archery is the model for Aristotle in 
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establishing the doctrine of the mean. He also describes someone who can “miss ˷hamartanein˹” in many ways 
in achieving the mean (NE, 1106b29). 
The model of archery has, of course, been noticed in both Aristotelian scholarship and Confucian scholarship.xx 
However, it has never been given a central place in interpreting either Aristotelian or Confucian mean. By putting 
these two doctrines together, and noting their similarities, we are led to the view that the model of archery must be 
of key importance in understanding what virtue is. 
First, the model of archery explains why, for both Aristotle and Confucius, the mean is both the right and the 
middle. In shooting an arrow, in particular when one is practicing archery, the right target is the bull’s eye, which is 
the middle point of the target. Here, to hit the right target is precisely to hit the middle. For a virtuous agent, to hit 
the mean is to say that he, like an archer, hits the right target or gets it right with respect to passions and actions. 
Second, the model of archery suggests a new answer to the following question: Why does each side, 
independently, derive a “trinitarian scheme” in which the mean is the middle between excess and defect? There are 
interpretations for the origin of the trinitarian scheme in the scholarship on both sides. On the Confucian side, 
Kanaya Osamu relates this scheme to the mode of thinking that has wide currency in ancient Chinese philosophy, 
that is, the tendency to harmonize opposites. In his understanding, a mean is “marked by a harmonious structure” 
coming out of two extremes.xxi This view is attractive, but problematic. According to the Confucian structure of 
zhong (the inner mean)-he (harmony, the outer mean) in the beginning part of the Mean, harmony does not appear to 
be the cause of the inner mean, but results from the exercise (fa) of the inner mean. Several hypotheses have been 
presented on Aristotle’s side. The first holds that this trinitarian structure is derived from the Greek medical theory 
that health lies in balancing contraries. It is suggested that to describe a virtue as a mean indicates that it is a mixture 
or fusion of a pair of contrary tendencies, a mixture between the associated vices.xxii This is rejected by Charles 
Young, who points out that in the NE, especially in II.6, the locus classicus of the doctrine of the mean, Aristotle 
“makes no attempt whatever to construe a virtue as a mixture of contraries”.xxiii In place of this interpretation based 
on the idea of harmony between contraries, Young takes the mean to be “a pattern of action and passion that falls 
between the excessive pattern exhibited by persons with one of the vices in that sphere and the deficit pattern 
exhibited by persons with the other vice”.xxiv In his understanding, the doctrine of the mean is in contrast to the 
theory of Contrariety (which he ascribes to Plato), according to which each virtue is associated with but a single 
vice, its opposite or contrary. Aristotle advances his doctrine of the mean because he “believes there is a structure to 
vice that Contrariety cannot describe and organize”. xxv  Young’s position is in turn criticized by J. David 
Blankenship who points out, among other things, that Aristotle himself does not reject the idea that virtue and vice 
are contraries, and that it is even problematic to say Plato believes in the theory of Contrariety. Rather, the idea of 
the mean is implied in Plato.xxvi 
The model of archery enables us to propose a different explanation for the origin of the trinitarian scheme. The 
right point is the bull’s eye that is located in the middle, and there are in general two possibilities in which one 
would miss the bull’s eye. If we view the target vertically, the arrow misses the target because it goes either too high 
or too low; and if we view the target horizontally, the arrow misses the bull’s eye because it goes either to the left or 
to the right. In any case, no matter the angle from which we look, the mean or middle point stands between two 
deviant directions. Analogically, one’s character can be said to err in two ways, and virtue is the mean that stands 
between two vices. This is apparently what both Aristotle and Confucius are saying. 
Third, based on the above discussion, the vices of excess and defect cannot be understood strictly as two extreme 
points. Instead, they are two general headings under which all defective characters and actions are grouped, and 
under each heading there is a range of characters and actions. This explains why Aristotle sometimes leaves aside 
the trinitarian scheme, and says that there could be many ways in which one could go wrong (NE, 1106b28-35), and 
that to hit the mark is difficult, but to miss the mark is easy (NE, 1106b29-33). This is certainly true of the varied 
and complex situations of human lives and actions. 
Indeed, the model of archery leads us to appreciate the fact that all vices cannot be equally bad. If point ten is the 
bull’s eye, points nine to one are all deviant. Nevertheless, hitting nine points is far better than hitting one point. 
Thus, vices are nothing more than “going beyond” and “falling short,” and, given that “vice” is such a laden term, it 
is indeed misleading to translate Aristotle’s word kakia as “vices.” Kakia should just mean “defective.” Aristotle 
says: “The man, however who deviates little from goodness is not blamed, whether he does so in the direction of the 
more or of the less, but only the man who deviates more widely” (NE, 1109b18-20). At NE, 1106b25-26, he also 
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mentions that excess is “a form of failure.” Confucius equally advises not to reject “going beyond” and “falling 
short” exclusively (Analects 13:21). If you cannot find a person with A+ quality, A- or B+ are also acceptable. 
Finally, if the model of archery explains why the mean is identified with the right and also how the trinitarian 
scheme is construed, then we should not take too seriously the idea that the mean is quantitative. On some occasions 
the right manifests itself as quantified determinations of amount, or as proportions, and it can also be the 
symmetrical middle on a continuum between excess and defect. However, it can also have nothing to do with a 
continuum. What is essential is to attain the right. 
3. The Inner Mean and Virtue 
The model of archery makes good sense of “hitting the mean” and hence the outer mean. Now let us extend the 
model of archery to our inquiry about the inner mean. The outer mean and the inner mean are inseparable and the 
inner mean-outer mean structure itself reminds one of the image of an archer aiming at the target. What enables the 
archer to hit the target correctly is his acquired skill in archery. By analogy, for a virtuous agent, since the hitting of 
the mean in passions and actions is issued from the inner mean, it follows that the inner mean must be a sort of skill-
like state in the agent, corresponding to the archer’s skill in archery. In other words, the exercise of the inner mean is 
analogical to shooting an arrow. The possession and exercise of the skills of archery make one good as an archer; 
correspondingly, the possession and exercise of the inner mean make one good as a human being. 
I believe this is precisely the approach that both Aristotelian and Confucian ethics take. For both, the central 
question of moral philosophy is to explain the state that makes one good as a human being and to discuss how one 
can achieve this state. 
This state is what Aristotle calls aretƝ (virtue) and what the Confucius calls ren (excellence). Aristotle says, “The 
virtue of man also will be the state which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well” (NE, 
1106a21-23). Similarly, ren is what makes a person a person. A person of ren, that is, an excellent person 
exemplifies the mean and is a paradigm of what human life should be (The Doctrine of the Mean, chap. 2). 
We have shown that both Aristotle and Confucius use the model of archery in explicating this inner state that 
makes one good as a human being. The failure of an archer results from his inappropriate grasp or exercise of 
archery. By the same token, the failure of an agent in life and action must be due to his or her failure in obtaining or 
exercising the inner mean (The Doctrine of the Mean, chap. 14). According to a report in The Doctrine of the Mean, 
chap.10, Confucius characterizes the excellent person as one who “stands in the middle, without leaning to either 
side.” This trinitarian structure, as we have said, is associated with archery. Mencius most explicitly claims that 
“Ren is like archery” (Mencius, 2a/7). 
On Aristotle’s side, we read: 
 
If it is, then, that every art ˷or craft, techne˹ does its work well by looking to the mean ˷meson˹ and judging its works by 
this standard... and if, further, virtue is more exact and better than any art, as nature also is, then it must have the quality of 
aiming at the mean ˷meson˹. (NE, 1106b7-16) 
 
This passage presupposes the analogy between a craft and virtue. If every good art is to aim at the mean in its 
sphere, virtue must be a kind of quality that enables an agent to aim at the outer mean. It is a commonplace that the 
craft analogy is regarded as one of the major argumentative strategies in Aristotle’s discussion of virtue. Our 
discussion shows that archery must be the central craft model he uses in his theory that virtue is the mean. As the 
above quoted passage indicates, the good of a craft is said to aim at the mean, and for Aristotle, “Virtue is a kind of 
mean, since it aims at what is the mean ˷meson˹” (NE, 1106b27-28). Hence, virtue is a craft-like quality.xxvii Just 
as possession of the skills of archery enables an archer to hit the target, so possession of virtue makes an agent feel 
and act rightly. This is the reason why he calls virtue itself the mean state. 
Why, then, do both sides, independently appeal to archery as a model? My suggestion is as follows. The Greek 
word aretƝ is related to the Greek god of war, Ares, and thus has association with manly qualities. When aretƝ is 
translated as virtus (from vir, literally “man”) in Latin (from which the English word “virtue” comes), the relation 
between this term and the manly qualities seems to be emphasized. On the Confucian side, the term ren was 
employed in the Book of Poetry to describe noble huntsmen, and it has been thought that ren originally meant 
“manly,” “manliness,” or “manhood.” I am led to think that this parallel of the original senses of arƝte and ren can 
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cast light on the parallel between Aristotle’s mean and the Confucian mean. Both Aristotle and Confucius lived in a 
time which was still heavily influenced by the values of ancient heroic societies, especially the admiration of heroes 
in war and hunting. This is probably why, when they start to think about what virtue is in an ethical life, each seeks 
to establish a virtuous agent as a counterpart of the hero in war and hunting. Now archery, given its central role in 
war and hunting, is one of the most important skills that make a person a hero in ancient heroic societies. It enables a 
man to show his “manhood” or “manliness.” Could this be the reason that both Aristotle and Confucius appeal to 
archery as a model in explicating their conceptions of virtue, leading to the formation of two separate doctrines of 
the mean?  
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